radicalnorthbelfast

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

Executive Summary 3

Context 5

Evaluating the North Belfast Strategy 8

The New Build Programme 10

Analysis of Strategy 12

Conclusion 20

Appendix 21

The information in this document is copyrighted by the author and it is not to be reproduced without the author’s permission.

INTRODUCTION

St Patrick’s and St Joseph’s Housing Committee represents a number of housing groups throughout nationalist areas of North Belfast. In 2000, the North Belfast Strategy was launched to address the chronic housing need in the area. Within the Catholic community the main issue was the large waiting list. However after four years of the Strategy’s operation, the waiting list had increased, as had the Catholic community’s share of the total. The Committee commissioned this research in order to identify the reason for this occurrence.

This Research Paper consists of four sections.

Section 1 provides the context to the issue of the waiting list in North Belfast. It focuses on the origin and role of the institution responsible for meeting housing need (the Northern Ireland Housing Executive) and the historical causes of the waiting list.

Section 2 describes how the North Belfast Strategy planned to tackle the housing issue in North Belfast and the measures it employed to assess its progress. It then reviews the impact of the strategy on the waiting list to date.

Section 3 assesses the new build programme, which was the main mechanism by which the North Belfast Strategy proposed to tackle the waiting list crisis. It reveals a significant gulf between where need exists and where houses have been built.

Section 4 provides an analysis of the Strategy. It explains the agenda underpinning political Unionism in North Belfast and correlates this with the Housing Executive’s approach to North Belfast.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Housing has played a significant, contentious and indeed a notorious role in the politics of Northern Ireland. The government’s report into the origins of the civil disturbances in 1969 acknowledged that discrimination in the building and allocation of houses by local councils was a central and warranted grievance of nationalists. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) was established as the Regional Housing Authority in 1971, ostensibly to end Unionist political abuse of housing. This was to be achieved by applying an objective points system to the allocation of housing.

The waiting list in North Belfast was a key aspect of the “chronic housing need” which existed in North Belfast. Demographic trends have long indicated a growing Catholic population and a declining Protestant community. This, in addition to the Executive’s decision to ‘concentrate’ its New Build programme in Protestant areas with waning demand, meant that the waiting list primarily became a problem for the Catholic community. By March 2000, although approximately 40% of households in North Belfast are Catholic, some 73% of the 1,640 households on the waiting list were Catholic. Furthermore, Catholics constituted 81% of the 880 households in the priority category of urgent need.

The North Belfast Strategy was launched in 2000 and undertook to address this issue, primarily through the New Build Programme. However, it has become abundantly apparent that the Strategy is failing to address the waiting list and the community differential. Between March 2000 and March 2004 the overall waiting list increased by 10% and the urgent need waiting list grew by 8%. The proportion of Catholics in the urgent need category increased from 81% to 83%.

It is clear from the operation of the new build programme why this has happened. Only 22% of housing units promised in Catholic areas have been delivered. Of those houses which have been built, only 69% have been in Catholic areas. Many houses have been built in Protestant areas with negligible demand.

Despite the weight of evidence showing that the Executive’s efforts to tackle the waiting list are a colossal failure, the NIHE has fervently defended the strategy and claimed that it is “right on track.”

The purpose of this research was to identify the reasons for the failure of the Executive’s Strategy to tackle the waiting list. Unable to comprehend the Executive’s conduct in housing terms, it was necessary to look for alternative explanations as to the organisation’s behaviour. One theory is that the Executive has been influenced by Unionist political lobbying and has consequently adopted a political agenda. In order to make a judgement as to the merit of this assertion, it was necessary to compare Unionist political goals in North Belfast with the Executive’s housing programme in the area.

The DUP’s 2005 election slogan ‘Keep North Belfast Unionist!’ succinctly expresses the Unionist goal in North Belfast. The Unionist electoral majority has narrowed considerably in recent years; consequently Unionist organisations have attempted to stabilise their electoral base. Furthermore, Unionist paramilitaries have employed violence and intimidation to restrict Nationalist growth. From this perspective, meeting the growing Catholic demand for housing facilitates the growth of the Catholic (and nationalist) electorate and directly threatens Unionism’s electoral advantage. Similarly, the decline of the Unionist population in North Belfast undermines the Unionist electoral majority. Unionism’s political self-interest is therefore likely to be incompatible with the goal of addressing the growing need for housing within the Catholic community.

The Housing Executive has publicly identified with Unionism’s political goal by stating that in Unionist areas it wants to “attract people back” while its advice for Catholics is to “become more mobile” and move “to areas outside North Belfast”. In addition to this verbal support, the Executive’s actions betray striking parallels with Unionism’s political goals. The NIHE has refused to redraw community boundaries to reflect housing need, citing ‘political sensitivities’. Vacant and homes in Protestant areas are therefore not to be utilised by Catholics in housing need. The Executive has effectively encouraged rather than challenged the refusal of Unionist politicians and paramilitaries to allow Catholics to live in vacant homes in Protestant areas. Urban renewal has been used to stabilise and create Unionist demand. New build has been invested in Unionist areas with negligible demand, making housing more accessible and attractive to Unionists who might otherwise settle elsewhere. The Executive’s commitment to identifying and acquiring land for housing developments in nationalist areas is highly questionable. In addition, by massively failing to build new homes in Catholic areas at a level commensurate with the degree of housing need, Executive policy is effectively forcing Catholics out of the area.

The electoral impact of these activities was evident in the 2005 contest for the North Belfast Parliamentary seat. Between 1983 and 2001 the Unionist majority steadily declined. However in 2005 this trend reversed and the Unionist majority increased. Therefore the Executive’s chronic failure to meet nationalist demand has coincided with the stabilisation of the Unionist electoral majority.

To date, the Executive and the Department of Social Development (DSD) have failed to engage with criticism on this issue in a consistent or considered manner. Their erratic reaction to scrutiny, and fervent determination to press on with the Strategy despite the considerable evidence of its failure in housing terms, adds to the suspicion that an agenda, separate from that of simply addressing housing need, is in operation.

Need for social housing in North Belfast, as indicated by the waiting list and housing stress figures, is chronic and worsening. The Executive’s position on this issue is fundamentally flawed. A new approach to North Belfast is therefore required; one which is solely concerned with housing need and is not influenced or determined by sectarian political ‘sensitivities’.

1.0 CONTEXT

This paper analyses an issue of social need (for social housing) and the response of the institution responsible for meeting that need (the Housing Executive). The historical development of the social problem and the analogous public body will be summarised before the immediate context of the current housing crisis is discussed.

1.1 Origins of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive

Housing has played an important and controversial role in the politics of Northern Ireland since the state’s inception. Discrimination in housing, in addition to other spheres, was a major grievance highlighted by civil rights organisations such as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. The Unionist government-commissioned ‘Cameron Report’ looked into the causes of the civil disturbances of the period and outlined how the discrimination operated. Responsibility for building and allocating houses lay with local councils, many of which were ‘gerrymandered’ in order to ensure Unionist control in areas with a majority nationalist population. One example was Derry County Borough “where sixty per cent of the adult population was Catholic but where sixty per cent of the seats on the Corporation were held by Unionists” (Cameron Report). Electoral advantage was also facilitated by a restricted franchise which benefited Unionists.

Having gained control of housing, Unionist local councils built and allocated houses in such a way as to maintain the Unionist electoral majority. Thus, Catholics were unlikely to be provided with housing in areas in which the Unionist electoral supremacy was felt to be threatened. As the Cameron Report described the Unionist position, the criteria for housing “was not actual need but maintenance of the current political preponderance in the local government area”.

The Housing Executive was established as Northern Ireland’s Regional Housing Authority in 1971 and assumed the powers of local councils. The desire to replace the criteria of Unionist political interest with the criteria of social need was shown by the introduction of a points system in the allocation of houses.

1.1.2 The Current Role of the Housing Executive

1.1.2.1 Meeting Need

The Housing Executive is responsible for assessing housing need and developing strategies to address that need. The first of its eight Corporate Objectives, as set out in its Corporate Plan for 2004-2005 is:

“To ensure that all social housing programmes and services are delivered in a manner which is demonstrably fair and equitable, on the basis of objective assessment of need”.

1.1.2.2 Reducing Inequality

The Executive’s first Corporate Objective refers to the “duty to provide equality of opportunity in all our policies and services” under section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. This includes the following obligations:

• To work towards the reduction or removal of any existing inequalities.
• To prevent the emergence of any future inequalities of opportunity (new inequalities and/or the worsening of any existing inequalities).

The Executive defined ‘opportunity’ as:

1. The range of choices available to each individual in the context of any Executive function (including housing and other services provided by the Executive)
2. The quality of housing and other Executive services available to each individual
3. The timescales within which that housing and/or any such services becomes available to an individual.

These responsibilities are relevant to the issue of the waiting list which is discussed below.

1.2 The Waiting List

1.2.1 Origins of the Waiting List in North Belfast

A number of factors have contributed to the development of the waiting list in North Belfast. Demographic change is one cause. In 1987 a Housing Executive study identified contrasting demographic trends within the Catholic and Protestant communities. It stated that “Catholic North Belfast is characterised by an increasing level of population and households, and tends to have a younger age structure” whilst “Protestant North Belfast is characterised by a falling level of population and households, and tends to have an ageing age structure.” The study further stated that between 1971-1985 the Catholic population in North Belfast grew by 6.4% whilst the Protestant population fell by 38%. The number of Protestant households fell by 27.6% in contrast to Catholic households which increased by 11.8%. Although the higher Catholic birth rate was undoubtedly a major factor in the demographic trend, research carried out by the Community Relations Council identified another important issue:

“As the eastern part of Northern Ireland has been predominately Protestant, working class Protestants from the inner city estates had more options for moving to new houses and estates than did Catholics. Many took up this possibility, while Catholics largely consolidated their presence in the existing communities.” (Demography, Development and Disorder, 2004)

Interestingly, rather than simply meeting the changing nature of need, the Executive’s 1987 report stated that the decline of the Protestant population was a “cause for concern.” It commented that despite the contrasting demographic trends within the two communities, much of North Belfast’s New Build Programme was “concentrated” in Protestant areas where there was excess housing stock (10 out of 11 areas in Belfast with excessive stock were in Protestant districts). On this basis, the report gave an “artificially low” estimate that there would be 750 excess dwellings in Protestant North Belfast by 1995. In contrast a shortfall of 400 units was predicted within the Catholic community. This is significant because it shows that the Housing Executive, instead of adjusting to meet the growing Catholic need, was ‘concerned’ about the development. Furthermore, rather than ensuring that the Catholic community’s need for housing stock was addressed, the Executive decided to continue to concentrate new build where need was declining. Effectively, the Executive took the conscious decision to ensure that housing supply would not meet demand from the Catholic community.

The huge Catholic waiting list in North Belfast is therefore partly the result of natural demographic changes within the Catholic community. However the evidence presented above shows that it is also a direct and deliberate result of the Housing Executive’s New Build Programme, which was concentrated in Unionist areas with falling demand.

1.2.2 The Waiting List Crisis in 2000

The 2001 census showed that Catholic households represent 39.5% of all households in North Belfast while Protestant households make up 57.9% of the total of 36,381 (NISRA, 2001). However, at the launch of the strategy in March 2000 Catholic households constituted 73% of the 1,640 households on the waiting list. Furthermore, 880 (54%) of households on the waiting list were in the priority category of urgent need/housing stress. Catholic households constituted 81% of this figure.

This waiting list differential was reflected by the fact that Catholic applicants had to wait “much longer” (NBS, p. 18) for accommodation than Protestants (although no specific figure was provided by the Executive). In contrast, ‘market failure’ or excess supply was increasing in Protestant areas. The strategy undertook to address this problem through land acquisition and new build.

Clearly, the community differentials in respect of access to housing (as expressed by the waiting list and waiting times) and quality of housing (as shown by levels of unfitness) dictated that the North Belfast Strategy would have to be geared towards reducing these inequalities.

1.3 Conclusion

• The Housing Executive was ostensibly established to end the political abuse of housing and ensure that housing was provided on the basis of need.

• In 1987 the Housing Executive acknowledged the contrasting demographic trends within the two communities yet continued to concentrate its new build programme in Unionist areas with excess supply.

• The Executive forecast and intended that its housing policy would create significant excess Catholic demand.

• The Executive has a statutory duty to tackle the waiting list and reduce the community differential.

2.0 EVALUATING THE NORTH BELFAST STRATEGY

The North Belfast Strategy document Tackling Housing Need (2000) proposed to tackle the large waitin list by increasing housing supply. This was to be achieved primarily by building new homes and supported through the purchasing of land. So how did it intend to measure its success and how effective has the strategy been?

2.1 Measuring Progress

The four targets set out in the Strategy document Tackling Housing Need (2000) are given below.

• The overall housing list will be reduced by about half over the [seven year] period. More importantly, it is anticipated that the number of urgent need cases will be reduced from 880 to 320, a reduction of almost two thirds.

• In addition, the number of family households is expected to fall from 370 to about 120 over the period.

• Waiting time differentials between Catholic and Protestant applicants will be eroded, such that, on average, all urgent housing needs can be met within a year of registration.

• Housing condition differentials will be removed.

These targets are reasonably ambitious in terms of eroding overall need and in regard to the eradication of housing condition differentials. However, while the Strategy aimed to remove the housing unfitness differential (which disadvantaged Protestants) it did not even propose to reduce the waiting list differential (which disadvantaged Catholics). Instead there is a reference to eroding waiting time differentials so that “on average, all urgent housing needs can be met within a year of registration.” Clearly though, the waiting list is the core issue; waiting times are simply a by-product of the problem. Furthermore, this target, while referring to waiting time differentials, does not in fact measure waiting times; it measures the average length of time all households spend in housing stress. This means that the target could be achieved without reducing the differential.

It should also be noted that this target does not state what the base position is. For example, while the housing list is to be reduced from 880 to 320, the Executive only declares what the target waiting time is. Without knowing the average time at the start of the strategy, the public is unable to assess how ambitious the target is.

Either this target was an example of incompetence or the Housing Executive wished to give the impression that it was intent on reducing the waiting time differential while actually setting itself a quite different goal of reducing overall waiting times.

2.2 Impact of Strategy

2.2.1 Waiting List Figures

Between March 2000 and March 2004:

• The overall waiting list increased by 10%.
• The urgent need waiting list increased by 8%.
• The number of Catholics households in housing stress had risen from 716 to 793 (11%).
• The number of Protestant households in housing stress had fallen from 164 to 158 (4%).
• The proportion of Catholic households in housing stress increased from 81% to 83%.

Source: North Belfast Housing Strategy, 3rd Annual Report 2004

2.2.2 Waiting Time Figures

The average waiting time for suitable accommodation is:

• 18 months for a single Catholic and 12 months for a single Protestant.
• 23 months for a Catholic family and 10 months for a Protestant family.
• 50 months for an elderly Catholic applicant and 44 months for an elderly Protestant.

Source: Letter from Housing Executive to St. Patrick’s & St. Joseph’s Housing Committee (6/01/05)

2.3 Conclusion

The following points summarise this section:

• The North Belfast Strategy set itself reasonably ambitious targets to reduce the overall and urgent need waiting lists.

• Although the strategy aimed to completely eradicate the housing condition differentials (which disadvantaged Protestants) no meaningful target was set for reducing the housing stress differentials (in which Catholics were over-represented).

• Four years into the seven year strategy, the overall and urgent need waiting list both increased significantly.

• The community differential in respect of the urgent need waiting list has increased with the Catholic share growing from 81% to 83%.

3.0 THE NEW BUILD PROGRAMME

The previous section illustrated that the overall and urgent need waiting list has increased over the period of the strategy, as has the Catholic community’s share of the housing stress total. In this chapter, the new build programme, which represents the main method by which the waiting list was to be tackled, will be analysed. In identifying where new houses have been built, a huge discrepancy between the location of need and the placing of houses will be revealed.

3.1 New Build

3.1.1 New Build in Catholic Areas

A total of 1,750 new homes were proposed over the seven years of the North Belfast Strategy. Some 1,640 households were on the waiting list in March 2000. Of these, 880 were in housing stress. The strategy document stated that new builds would be programmed for urgent need cases and the NIHE briefing notes that accompanied the launch of the strategy stated that:

“The Housing Executive is satisfied that sufficient new homes can be built on sites within Catholic North Belfast to cut out the long waiting lists. The Housing Executive has identified 20 sites that altogether could provide around 1,600 units of accommodation.” (NIHE Briefing Notes to North Belfast News, 4/10/2000)

This suggests that 1,600 (91%) of the 1,750 units would be geared towards the Catholic community. Given that Catholics constituted 81% of the waiting list and that there is a much greater rate of growth in the Catholic community, this seems a reasonable figure. It is also in line with the need projected under the DOE’s Belfast Metropolitan Plan, which recommended that 91% of new builds be in Catholic areas over the next seven years. (Population & Housing, 2004) On this point it should be noted that this figure of 91% was adjusted from the original estimate of 100%, to take into account the Executive’s commitment to new build under the ‘regeneration’ agenda.

However from 2001-2005, figures provided by the NIHE and presented in appendix one indicate that only 620 housing units have been built in nationalist areas. This figure includes schemes already planned before the introduction of the strategy, which were not supposed to be included in strategy figures. Indeed the Executive stated in its briefing notes that the 1,600 housing units were to be built in Catholic North Belfast “on top of the 710 units of accommodation that are already planned.” This means that a total of 2,310 units were to be built over the seven year period. The figures provided by the Executive also include 101 acquisitions in Catholic areas. The procurement of existing homes was designated as a separate activity in the North Belfast Strategy (see Tackling Housing Need, p.23-24) and should not be considered as ‘new build’. Taking all this into account, four years into the seven-year Strategy, only 519 (22%) of the 2,310 units promised for Catholic areas of North Belfast have been delivered.

In addition to the number of housing units being substantially less than that which was promised, the Catholic allocation of new build which has been delivered has not reflected the community’s respective level of need. As stated above, housing need and demographic trends dictated that at least 90% of the new build programme should have been delivered in Catholic districts. However, of the 757 new build units included in the Housing Executive’s figures, only 519 (69%) are in Catholic districts. In this context it is easy to see why the actual and relative position of the Catholic community is worsening.

3.1.2 New Build in Protestant Areas

Excluding the acquisitions, which have been included by the Executive in new build figures, 31% of new builds were in Protestant areas, despite Protestant households representing 19% of the urgent need list. Importantly, many of these new homes were built in areas without identifiable need for new housing.

3.1.2.1 Gainsborough/Mountcollyer

A Housing Executive memo (14/11/94) stated that recently in Mountcollyer “a number of the privately owned properties became vacant and they are presently blocked up, mainly due to a lack of demand in the area.” In October 2003, 260 voids existed in Gainsborough/Mountcollyer. The waiting list in the area was 34 in December 2003 with 13 in housing stress (Belfast District Housing Plan 2004/2005). Despite this, 35 new builds are planned for Mountcollyer in 2004/2005 and 26 for Gainsborough in 2005/2006.

3.1.2.2 Grove

In 1998 a Housing Executive survey in the Grove found that “housing demand for the area, in its current form, remains low” and that “the projected need for Grove Housing Association stock indicates a sharp and substantial surplus of accommodation over demand in the short to long term.” This was evident in the waiting list figures which showed that at the end of December 2003 the Grove area contained 35 Waiting List applicants with 7 in urgent stress (Belfast District Housing Plan 2004/2005). In 2002/03 some 41 new houses were built in the Grove followed by 18 in 2003/2004.

3.1.2.3 Torrens

In October 2003 there were 87 voids in the Torrens area. A total of 11 households were on the waiting list in December 2003 and 5 were in urgent need. Under the Housing Strategy 34 new builds are due for 2004-2005.

3.1.2.4 Wheatfield

In October 2003 Wheatfield had 166 voids. In December of that year 24 households were on the waiting list, 9 of which were in urgent stress. Some 31 new houses have been built in Wheatfield as part of the strategy.

3.2 Allocation of Housing Executive Properties

As a consequence of the failure under the new build programme to build where need was greatest, more Executive properties have been allocated to Protestants than Catholics. This is despite the fact that the latter group constitutes the vast majority of those in urgent need. According to Housing Executive estimates for the period from December 2001 to September 2004, Catholic households were allocated 853 properties in North Belfast compared to 957 which were allocated to Protestant households. Some 53 households were categorised as ‘other’ and the religion of 139 applicants was not established. This means that Protestants were allocated 48% of properties yet made up around 19% of the urgent need waiting list. Catholics were allocated 43% of homes despite representing approximately 81% of households in housing stress.

3.3 Conclusion

In summary:

• The Housing Executive stated that 1,600 housing units would be build in Catholic areas of North Belfast on top of the 710 already planned. Only 519 (22%) of these 2,310 units have been delivered.

• Some 91% of new houses were to be built in Catholic areas. This was an appropriate proportion given the Catholic community’s existing and anticipated level of need. However, only 69% of the 757 new builds have been in Catholic areas.

• Many of the new builds in Protestant areas were in districts where negligible need existed.

• More Housing Executive properties have been allocated to Protestant households than to Catholic households between December 2001 and September 2004.

4.0 ANALYSIS

The previous section clearly demonstrated that the North Belfast Strategy has failed to tackle the issue of the waiting list due to a huge discrepancy between where need for houses exists and where houses are being built. Despite this the Executive remains resolute in its determination to push ahead with the programme. Indeed the Executive maintains that the “strategy for North Belfast is right on track.” (North Belfast News, 5/07/2003) As this does not benefit the agenda of meeting social need it is necessary to ask; what agenda does it suit? Therefore in this section the political implications of the North Belfast Strategy and will be discussed, as will the hypothesis that political lobbying has corrupted the Executive’s activity in North Belfast.

4.1 The Unionist Housing Strategy

The demographic trends discussed earlier have obvious implications for Unionism’s electoral majority in the area. Research carried out by the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister into interface violence described the Unionist concern as follows:

“Because of the demographics of the area with a young and growing Catholic community and an ageing and declining Protestant community, the shift in territorial identity is seen as one directional: Protestant/unionist areas are changing and becoming Catholic/nationalist areas. Nationalists are therefore perceived to be gaining ground (both in a territorial and a political sense) and unionists are losing ground as the boundaries begin to shift. It is thus increasingly important to defend the boundaries of one’s area and ensure that the land does not pass into the hands of the ‘other’. Even if there is no demand for housing within one’s own community ownership of the land must be maintained and the boundaries must not change.” (Managing Disorder, 2002)

The aim of Unionism in the north of the city is summed up by the recent election slogan of the area’s DUP MP Nigel Dodds: “Keep North Belfast Unionist!” (www.dup.org). In order to preserve its electoral majority in North Belfast, Unionism has to maintain its territorial hold of the area. The strategy to achieve this consists of two main aspects; preventing Catholics from moving in to Protestant areas on one hand (the ‘stick’), and attempting to engineer demand from Protestants on the other (the ‘carrot’). Each will be looked at in turn.

4.1.1 Enforcing the Orange Line

Unionist paramilitaries have led the campaign to prevent Catholics from moving in to Catholic areas. As the UDA explained in 2004 an “Orange Line” has been drawn around Protestant areas:

“We have declared an orange line around all Protestant areas. Whilst we realise that one community is growing faster than the other we cannot allow another garden, another house or another street to be attacked.”

The Orange Line has been policed in three main ways. Firstly Unionist paramilitaries instigated a campaign of interface violence. Internally, rioting along interfaces reinforced the siege mentality within the Protestant community and strengthened their determination to prevent nationalists from ‘taking’ homes in their area. Violent attacks intimidated Catholics from moving in to homes in Protestant districts. Importantly, it made any plan to redraw boundaries or promote mixed estates a political ‘hot potato’.

Moreover, by provoking a reaction from Republican areas, Unionist politicians could portray the Orange Line as a necessary form of defence from Republican aggression, rather than a sectarian policy. This represented the second means of policing the Orange Line: accusing Republicans of forcing out Unionists. For example, in June 2000 the SDLP called on the Housing Executive to take action on the waiting list in North Belfast. As Minister for Social Development, the area’s DUP MP Nigel Dodds was responsible for housing. He compared this demand to Adolf Hitler’s practice of ‘lebensraum’, a policy of Nazi expansion involving ethnic cleansing in German-occupied territories. The Minister defended his comments arguing that:

“The reality is that ordinary Protestants on the ground have seen the area being run down and neglected over the years, having been forced out by the IRA and Sinn Fein Hitlerite Nazi tactics. What we are now seeing is demands led by nationalist politicians to take away the peace lines- it’s a recipe for civil war.” (Irish News, 28/06/2000)

In an earlier example, Cecil Walker, the Unionist MP previous to Nigel Dodds, sent a letter to the Housing Executive protesting that “complacence” in White City was encouraging Republicans to “force Protestants to vacate the area for a take over” (1995). In support of this claim he attached a list of Catholics who the Executive had allowed to take up residence in the area.

By associating the idea of Catholics being allowed to reside in Protestant areas with a Republican ‘take over’, a sectarian position is thus portrayed as reasonable self-defence, while the idea of mixed estates or the redrawing of boundaries is synonymous with ‘giving in’ to the IRA.

4.1.2 Legitimising the Orange Line

Unionism faced a difficult challenge in substantiating the claim that the disorder along interfaces was being initiated by the IRA. This was because it was abundantly clear that loyalists were responsible for the vast majority of the violence. A review of events of any month in this period clearly indicates this (the CAIN website provides a respected independent chronology of events). Indeed, despite the media constantly blaming ‘both communities’ equally, the weight of evidence eventually forced the Assistant Chief Constable for Belfast to admit that the “significant majority” of violence came “from loyalist groupings.” (bbc.co.uk) Furthermore, after a number of warnings and ‘second chances’ the Secretary of State was forced to withdraw recognition of the UDA ceasefire in October 2001.

In order to attach responsibility to the IRA, Unionists ignored, justified or denied the existence of loyalist violence. At times this was blatantly exposed. For example, in November 2001 a member of the UDA’s youth wing died when his pipe bomb exploded in his hand. Glen Branagh, a 17 year-old youth from Mountcollyer Street in the Tiger’s Bay area if North Belfast, was in the process of throwing the device into the nationalist New Lodge area. Eddie Mclean, an ex-UDA prisoner and the Unionist spokesperson in the area stated that:

“The bomb was thrown from the Republican side. He picked it up to throw it away when it exploded. Glen saw the device thrown from the nationalist side and was calling for the area to be cleared. He lifted it and shouted at people to get out of the way. He died a hero.” (APRN, 15/11/01)

The North Belfast MP, Nigel Dodds, did not accept the word of the police and instead argued that there should be:

“A full investigation into the circumstances as to exactly what happened.” (BBC News, 12/10/01)

An incident in September 2002 provided another illustration. Davy Mahood, a senior figure in the UDA-aligned Ulster Political Research Group described in detail an alleged attempt on his life by Republicans:

“The bullet missed. The gun jammed and when he tried to clear it, it jammed again. He was standing in a car park at the time.” (utvlive.com, 12/09/2002)

The UTV report stated that “Mr Mahood has been closely involved in efforts to ease tensions in the flashpoint Ardoyne area.” (ibid) It is unclear on what basis the UTV presented as fact the assertion that the UPRG, and by extension the UDA, was attempting to “ease tensions” in the area. The report went on to quote Mr Mahood as saying that the ‘attack’ was made because “the period of calm we are having at the minute wouldn’t suit some.” Nigel Dodds concurred stating that the incident was “clearly aimed at stoking up tensions.” Both statements were correct. However, whose agenda it suited became clear when it materialised that the ‘attack’ was totally fabricated. Unfortunately this did not emerge before the UDA shot a number of innocent Catholics as part of a “measured military response” to alleged Republican aggression.

In September 2001, over 700 Unionists were involved in a riot with police on the Crumlin Road. Six blast bombs, 125 petrol bombs and gunfire were used in the attack. Assistant Chief Constable Alan McQuillan commented that “the police found themselves in the middle attempting to prevent a concerted attack on the nationalist community.” (Irish Examiner, 28/09/01) Nigel Dodds excused the violence by claiming loyalists that were reacting to the fact that the government had “consistently ignored IRA breaches of ceasefires.” (ibid)

The themes outline above are illustrated in the following excerpt from an article by Henry McDonald which focused on a gun attack on Catholic families in the Cliftonville area of North Belfast:

“The gun attack…came just hours after Johnny Adair alleged that the IRA had tried to kill him in a pipe-bomb attack. However, Sinn Fein, the RUC, rival loyalists in the Ulster Volunteer Force, and even some of Adair’s own comrades in the UDA, believe the ‘attack’ was a ploy to provide an excuse for anti-ceasefire loyalists to return to war on north Belfast’s streets…residents of this growing Catholic enclave are threatening to leave en masse unless their homes can be secured.”

The article continued:

“It started a fortnight ago when Protestant homes in south, west and north Belfast came under co-ordinated attack. Sinn Fein denied that Republicans were involved in any of the incidents. Republicans claim that loyalists stage-managed many of the forays into Protestant areas in order to ferment sectarian clashes and provide an opportunity for the UDA to portray itself as the defender of the loyalist people.”

“Adair’s supporters have already tried to reclaim parts of north Belfast, which many Protestants perceive to be falling into Catholic hands. Carlisle Circus, a roundabout at the bottom of the two main thoroughfares, the Antrim and Crumlin roads, has recently been decorated in red, white and blue paint, UDA flags and sectarian graffiti. Territory is being marked out.” (The Observer, 20/08/2000)

4.1.3 The Housing Executive’s Orange Line

The third layer of security for the Orange Line was provided by the Housing Executive. The Executive recognised the ‘Orange Line’ in Tackling Housing Need (2000) stating that “surplus lands in one community are not readily available for use by the other” (p. 12). Paddy McIntyre, Chief Executive of the Housing Executive added that territory could not be adjusted to reflect need because it was a “politically sensitive issue.” (Press Release, 4/10/2000) This shows that six years after the ceasefires, the Executive was unwilling to prioritise social need ahead of Unionist political sensitivities. No mention was made of mixed housing estates, and the redrawing of community boundaries to reflect housing need was ruled out over the seven-year period. Effectively, the Executive policed the Orange Line declared by Unionist politicians and paramilitaries.

It is important to point out that the position adopted by the Executive did not protect Catholics from loyalist attacks. By using sectarian attacks to justify its Orange Line policy, the Executive effectively rewarded and encouraged loyalist violence. It provided Unionism with a choice; co-exist peacefully with your Catholic neighbours and we may have to redraw community boundaries, live in conflict and your electoral base will be protected. Far from challenging sectarianism, the Executive therefore ensured that sectarian conflict was to the political benefit of Unionism.

4.2 Stabilisation of Demand

In the face of a declining population, Unionists have been eager to stabilise and create demand in Unionist areas. In November 2001 Nigel Dodds, at the time both the DUP MP for North Belfast and Minister for Social Development, invested £16.5m in Gainsborough/Mountcollyer. While social need is considerable in many Unionist districts of North Belfast, the political nature of this funding was stressed by Nigel Dodds who argued that the money would “provide a sound basis for the restoration of confidence in this part of North Belfast.” Unionist ‘confidence’ in its electoral majority therefore took priority over objective housing need. He also described this as a:

“£16 million housing investment for two Unionist areas of North Belfast which have been badly affected by Republican violence.” (Orange Standard)

At times the dual strategy of stoking Unionist demand and intimidating Catholics were employed in unison. For instance the Holy Cross protest was ostensibly an attempt to prevent students at the Catholic Holy Cross Primary School from accessing the school at the front entrance in the Protestant Glenbryn estate. Tactics employed including shouting abuse and throwing balloons filled with urine at the children and their parents. On one occasion a pipe bomb was thrown as the children made their way to school. However Nigel Dodds explained that the protest was part of the wider Unionist housing strategy in North Belfast:

“No doubt you will have watched and read much about the blockade of the Holy Cross Primary School. However, rather than simply condemn those involved….I would suggest that it is more productive to ask what has driven ordinary people into such an extraordinary situation…The situation in North Belfast is about territory. It is about Republicans forcing Unionists out by any and every means at their disposal.” (Article for Grand Orange Lodge in Ireland)

The Holy Cross protest was therefore part of an attempt to prevent Catholics from moving in to Glenbryn. The group publicly leading the protest (Concerned Residents of Upper Ardoyne) elaborated on this, demanding that the school be closed. They argued that because Glenbryn “is a loyalist community” the government should “build a new school for these children in Ardoyne.” (wsws.org) The conditions attached for ending the Holy Cross protest included improved housing and a ‘peace’ wall to secure the territorial boundary. This was delivered in Sept 2001 when the DUP Minister responsible for housing, Maurice Morrow provided £8.7m to Glenbryn in urban renewal funding. Again this raised serious question marks over the criteria used to determine urban renewal spending.

4.2.1 Housing Executive Engineering of Demand

The Housing Executive has, in word and deed, subscribed to the political ‘stabilisation’ agenda outlined above. For example, an Executive report on the Grove stated that “it is also important to find new non-housing uses for the Executive surplus lands here which would help to stabilise the area and even draw people to live here.”

The 1999 North Belfast Sectoral Study stated that the decline in population of

“Gainsborough/Mountcollyer represents a major problem and intervention, in the light of market failure, will be required.”

The political nature of this policy is illustrated by the comments made in 1996 by Colm McCaughley, at the time the Regional Director for Belfast, who stated that:

“It is clear that the Grove is in the first stage of decline. To intervene early in the area could only be justified on the grounds that not to do so would result in the loss of the community.” (1996)

For “loss of the community” we can read “loss of Unionist territory” and consequently electoral strength.

4.2.1.1 Urban Renewal Areas

Intervention has indeed occurred in Gainsborough and Mountcollyer as both have been designated as Urban Renewal Areas (URA’s). This followed concerted Unionist campaigning. For example the DUP website argued that Belfast Councillor Ian Crozier was a “leading advocate on unionist housing issues” as shown by the fact that he “supported Gainsborough and Mountcollyer URA schemes.” (www.dup.org.uk)

Tackling Housing Need (2000) was suspiciously confused over the designation of URA’s. On page 34 it states that URA assessments would be carried out in the Protestant districts of Mountcollyer, Gainsborough and Glenbryn and in Catholic New Lodge Upper. It therefore suggested that whether or not these areas would be successful had not yet been established. However on page 11 the document stated that the NIHE would seek to declare URA’s in Mountcollyer, Gainsborough and Glenbryn. No mention was made of New Lodge Upper which was later rejected.

The rationale used to justify the decision to reject the New Lodge area was also very questionable. The argument was that there were too few derelict houses i.e. voids in the area. However this does not take into account the fact that New Lodge inhabitants are not in a position to leave voids due to the long waiting times for nationalists in North Belfast. In effect, the fact that people are forced to stay in unfit homes due to the absence of an alternative (which is in turn a consequence of the Executive’s new build policy) was used to deny the area regeneration funding.

As the above example suggests, the Housing Executive’s focus on housing unfitness in determining urban renewal funding appears flawed. This is because the existence of a void is a major cause of housing unfitness. In other words if a house is left vacant due to lack of demand it is likely to become unfit. In North Belfast the vast majority of voids are in Protestant districts due to the lack of demand in these areas. As the Department of the Environment notes:

“There tends to be potential housing surpluses in protestant areas which gives rise to different problems such as empty dwellings, dereliction and unfitness.” (Belfast Metropolitan Plan, 2004)

Clearly, if the Orange Line was erased and Catholics were permitted to move into vacant homes in Protestant areas, they would be much less likely to fall into disrepair. Instead the urban renewal scheme has been used to improve or rebuild vacant houses in order to stabilise Protestant demand.

On this point it is worth noting that the Executive has defended its failure to encourage mixed estates by arguing that it cannot “socially engineer communities.” (Housing Agenda 2004, p. 58) However, this is precisely what it is attempting to do in order to ‘stabilise’ Unionism’s political strength in North Belfast. The Executive’s attempts to engineer demand in Protestant areas is all the more remarkable given its colossal failure to meet demand in Catholic areas.

4.3 Role of the New Build Programme

So how does the New Build scheme fit into the Unionist strategy outlined above? As was demonstrated in the previous section, only 22% of the housing units promised for Catholic areas of North Belfast have been delivered. Also, 69% of the new builds which have been delivered, are in Catholic areas. The Catholic share of the urgent need waiting list has consequently risen from 81% to 83%.

In the first instance this under-investment in Catholic areas makes it difficult for Catholics to find a NIHE home in North Belfast. It also means that house prices in Catholic areas will be driven up. In effect then, the lack of new build forces Catholics out of the North Belfast electoral area. In addition, a continued high level of new build in Unionist areas provides reassurance to Protestants that they are not in territorial decline. It also makes it easier for Protestants to find a home in North Belfast by lowering private housing prices and reducing waiting times for social houses (according to the Executive a Protestant family waits 10 months on average compared to 23 months for a Catholic family). And of course more Unionist residents means more Unionist votes.

Glenbryn provides one example of how this has operated. According to the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (Orange Standard, June 2003), Unionists were concerned that a re-development scheme in Glenbryn would entail the demolition of 160 houses with just 20 being re-built and the remaining land being turned into open spaces. For reasons already outlined, Unionists sought more new houses but feared that families would be reluctant to return to the area having settled elsewhere. The article stated that UUP councillor Fred Cobain urged the development of:

“A mix in the type of houses in order to attract both young married couples and senior citizens. This would be a great means of achieving stability in the area.”

The article concluded by stating that:

“Orange and Unionist representatives have appealed to former residents of Glenbryn to apply for new houses in the estate and help prove there is a need for more housing in North Belfast for Protestants.”

Responding to the news that 28 new homes would be built in Gainsborough, the local Resident’s Association stated that:

“It is excellent that there will be a mixture of homes for rent and purchase as this will encourage the community to remain in the area.” (Press Release, 2004)

These comments have been echoed in the Ireland on Sunday by Colm McCaughley who at the time was the Director of Client Services within the NIHE.

“There are two communities here which require two different solutions. In the Protestant community we have a classic inner city problem of a housing market in decline and an ageing population. The answer here is to renew and reinvent areas by demolishing low standard housing to attract people back. There should be a mix of public and private housing.”

While advocating new build in Protestant areas to create need where demand was virtually non-existent, his advice for nationalists whose needs the Executive was dramatically failing to meet was to:

“Become more mobile, moving for example to areas outside North Belfast.”

4.4 Acquiring Land

At the launch of the North Belfast Strategy the Executive stated that sites had already been identified in Catholic areas to support 1,600 new homes. When the location of houses under the new build scheme came in for criticism, the Executive, while refusing to acknowledge that there was a lack of investment in Catholic areas, simultaneously excused the lack of investment in Catholic areas by arguing that there were insufficient land sites in nationalist districts to support new build schemes. In response to this claim, St. Patrick’s and St. Joseph’s Housing Committee identified 38 non-contentious sites in district 4 of North Belfast. Having addressed the issue of land supply the Executive (while still refusing to recognise that there was a problem) argued that the problem was due to the high price of land in the area. The Housing Committee pointed out that the Executive had surplus land valued at £90 million, a fraction of which would have been sufficient to purchase adequate land for social housing to meet the urgent need waiting list.

In a further attempt to identify solutions to the problems cited by the Housing Executive, St. Patrick’s and St. Joseph’s Housing Committee also developed a proposal for an ‘urban village’ in Sailortown, near the (politically non-contentious) dockland area. This was based on an awarding winning project, which had transformed the docklands in Liverpool and envisaged a mixed-religion housing complex for over one thousand households. Seemingly unaware of the close to 2,000 households on the waiting list, almost half of which were in housing stress, the Executive claimed that there was insufficient demand for houses in the docks area. (North Belfast News, 16/01/03)

The BIH Housing Association, supported by the Housing Executive and the Department for Social Development then, without consulting the local community, started to build a ‘wet’ hostel (Stella Maris) in which residents with drug and alcohol problems would be permitted to drink alcohol. Far from being a safe environment to receive help and rehabilitation, local community groups argued that the nearby wet hostel in Brunswick Street was primarily a hub of anti-social behaviour rather than assistance.

When these three organisations were brought to court for their failure to consult with the local community, it was argued that there was no legal obligation to do so. This made headline news as many community and housing groups were shocked and angered by the position of these housing groups on the need for consultation. However from the perspective of the situation in North Belfast, it showed that the Executive preferred to use land desperately needed for housing as a ‘dumping ground’ for anti-social problems.

4.5 The Response of the Executive and the Department for Social Development

A number of issues discussed in this report have previously been raised publicly. For example, in 2002 a coalition of fifteen Housing Groups, on the basis of the Executive’s own new build figures, claimed that the new build programme did not reflect the level of need within the Catholic community. They further alleged that political interference was corrupting housing policy in North Belfast. In response, the Department for Social Development, on behalf of the Executive, claimed that the figures were “wrong” and that the argument was “unjustified” (North Belfast News, 12/10/2002). However, the DSD refused to be drawn into a serious debate over the figures, arguing that “it would be better for everyone if we worked together rather than get engaged in a dispute based on information that is factually wrong.”

The DSD’s response to the allegation that the political context of housing may be unduly influencing housing decisions, was in contradiction with NIHE statements. The North Belfast Strategy Document Tackling Social Need (2000) was fairly open about the political constraints on housing, recognising for example that issues around territory make housing “a politically sensitive issue.” The Executive defended its acceptance of political limitations, on the basis that the Strategy had to be “realistic.” While the Executive acknowledged the political interest in housing and attempted to justify its adjustment to political considerations, the DSD claimed to be unaware of any political content. It claimed that “this is not a political issue” and stated that “any suggestion that housing decisions are influenced by political considerations are nonsense and go against the ethos of the Housing Executive and the Department for Social Development.”

Remarkably, the DSD appeared to warn against further scrutiny, declaring that:

“Given other competing priorities for funding such as health, education and transport, ill informed statements calling for the strategy to be scrapped will undermine public confidence in the need for further investment.”

This referred to the view of the housing groups that because in its view the strategy had “failed…it should be scrapped or renegotiated.”

It would therefore appear that the Executive and the DSD have failed to engage with criticism of the North Belfast Strategy in a consistent or considered manner. That the scrutiny provoked such an erratic reaction indicates a lack of real confidence in the Executive’s record. This, in addition to the Executive’s fervent determination to maintain its approach in the face of a worsening urgent need and overall waiting list (particularly within the Catholic community), suggests that an alternative agenda exists at the highest level. The correlation between Unionist political goals and Executive housing programmes suggests that the possibility that that agenda is political carries considerable credibility.

4.6 Demographic & Electoral Impact

The squeeze of the supply of houses for Catholic households has forced many Catholics to move to areas such as Antrim, Glenavy, Crumlin and Glengormley. This has provoked a similar response from Unionists as that practised in inner North Belfast. Research carried out by the Community Relations Council found that:

“Demographic changes in Glengormley...have coincided with protests over the presence of an Orange arch in the centre of the town since 1999, and more recently there have also been numerous clashes between rival groups of young people in the commercial centre and leisure facilities in the town. In the past two years loyalist paramilitaries have mobilised against Catholic religious ceremonies in Carnmoney cemetery, have attacked gravestones and made threats against individuals.” (Demography, Development and Disorder, 2004)

In electoral terms, North Belfast contains 14 of Belfast City Council’s 51 seats and represents one of the 18 seats at Westminster. It is therefore a key electoral area. At a Belfast City Council level, between 1997 and 2001 nationalists went from holding 20 to 23 seats.

There is evidence to suggest that the impact of the Executive’s decision not to build houses on the basis of need has been felt electorally in recent years. The table below shows the Unionist and Nationalist totals in North Belfast elections. At each of these elections the gap between the Unionist and Nationalist vote narrowed up until 2001. However between 2001 and 2005 (the period which covers the North Belfast Strategy) the Unionist majority increased from 2,699 to 2,830. Policies which encourage Catholics to leave the area and Protestants to remain, inevitably have an electoral impact. It could be argued that such a strategy was a factor in the 2005 election result.

North Belfast Westminster Electoral Results, 1983-2005
Year Unionist Vote Nationalist Vote Difference
1983 28612 (67.5%) 11395 (26.9%) 17217
1987 22897 (62.2%) 10857 (29.4%) 12040
1992 21623 (60.3%) 12308 (34.3%) 9315
1997 23699 (57.2%) 16869 (40.6%) 6830
2001 21622 (52.8%) 18923 (46.2%) 2699
2005 16527 (54.1%) 13697 (44.8%) 2830

3.6 Conclusion

To summarise:

• Unionism’s electoral majority in North Belfast has been in decline for a number of years.

• In order to defend this majority, Unionist politicians have drawn an ‘Orange Line’ which prevents Catholics from living in Unionist areas. This has been enforced through paramilitary violence and intimidation.

• Unionists have justified the Orange Line by attempting to equate the concept of Catholics living in traditionally Protestant areas as a ‘concession’ to Republican violence.

• The Housing Executive has refused to challenge the Orange Line and has instead attempted to stabilise demand in Unionist areas.

• The New Build programme has served to cap Catholic growth and has helped to stabilise the Unionist electoral base.

• The Executive has shown little appetite for identifying and acquiring new land in Catholic areas.

• The Sailortown project had the potential to eradicate the urgent need waiting list but was actively undermined by the Executive and DSD.

• The Executive and DSD have failed to engage with criticism of the North Belfast strategy in a consistent or considered manner.

• Unionism’s declining electoral majority in the area has reversed since the launch of the North Belfast Strategy.

CONCLUSION

This paper has revealed a significant lack of correspondence between where new houses have been provided and where need for social housing exists; the percentage of homes built in Catholic districts is dramatically below the proportionate level of need in these areas. This has led to a situation in which the Catholic urgent need waiting list has increased both numerically and as a percentage of the overall total. Despite the worsening housing situation, the Executive deems the Strategy to be a success and remains fully committed to its new build programme.

This has led to a suspicion that the organisation has consciously adopted an objective, separate from that of objectively meeting housing need. This view is given credibility by the correlation between the Executive’s approach to North Belfast and the political interests of Unionism. The Executive’s advice to Catholics whose needs it is failing to meet is to move out of North Belfast. Protestants meanwhile, are urged to stay in the area. While the Executive chronically fails to meet Catholic need, it supports the desire of Unionist politicians to artificially create Protestant housing demand. The Executive’s new build programme, its record on land acquisition, its position on community boundaries and its use of urban renewal contribute to a situation in which Catholics are forced to leave North Belfast while Protestants are encouraged to remain in the area.

The goal of those committed to equality on this issue must be to ensure that all housing programmes are delivered in a way as to ensure that together, they address the waiting list in a fair and equitable manner. If the waiting list is to be seriously tackled in North Belfast, the Executive must adopt a new approach which is focused solely on housing need, rather than one which is dictated to by sectarian political ‘sensitivities’.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1: St Patrick’s and St Joseph’s Housing Committee

The primary aim of St. Patrick’s and St. Joseph’s Housing Committee is to “alleviate the chronic housing problem that besets North Belfast.” (A Shared Vision, 2004)

Groups affiliated to the Committee include:

• New Lodge Housing Forum

• Carrickhill Residents Association

• Sailortown Residents Association

• Seven Towers Residents

• Carlisle Residents Association

• Greencastle Residents Association

• Bawnmore Residents Association

• Lower North Queen Street Residents

• Sailortown Regeneration 2000

Appendix 2: New Build Schemes

The following is a list of the schemes included by the Executive in its new build programme for 2001-2005. The list, which was provided in a letter from the Executive to St. Patrick’s & St. Joseph’s on 1/12/04, has been divided into Catholic and Protestant areas. A number of sites planned for before the launch of the Strategy have been indicated with the sign (PS).

The 83 units planned for 2004-2005 as part of the Milk Marketing Board scheme has been excluded, as the proposed build has been rejected. The 101 acquisitions appear in italics and are not included in the new build total. This is because the acquisition of existing homes is a separate category from the building of new homes. The figures show that 519 units (68.6%) are in Catholic areas and 238 (31.4%) are in Protestant areas.

2001-2002

CATHOLIC COMMUNITY PROTESTANT COMMUNITY
Scheme Units Scheme Units
Prospect Phase 1 50 Wheatfield Phase 1 13
Clifton/Oldpark Phase 4 25
Newington Phase 6 10
New Lodge Phase 3 (PS) 13
North Queen Street (PS) 22
Carrickhill Phase 6 (PS) 43
TOTAL 163 TOTAL 13

2002-2003

CATHOLIC COMMUNITY PROTESTANT COMMUNITY
Scheme Units Scheme Units
Antrim Road 6 Westland Road 6
Pononby Avenue 3 Grove Phase 2 (PS) 41
Limestone Road 17
Cliftonville Road 12
Oldpark Road 25
Wolfhill 42
Whitewell Road (PS) 23
Whitewell Road (PS) 18
Carrickhill Acquisitions 5
Ardoyne Acquisitions 11
Newington Acquisitions 9
TOTAL 146 TOTAL 47

2003-2004

CATHOLIC COMMUNITY PROTESTANT COMMUNITY
Scheme Units Scheme Units
Ardilea 4 Glenbryn Phase 1 30
New Lodge Phase 4 21 Wheatfield 18
Coulters 32 Grove Phase 3 (PS) 18
Clifton/Oldpark Phase 5 26
Herbert Phase 1 32
Hicks Bullick 41
Ardoyne Acquisitions 25
Newington Acquisitions 18
Clanmil Acquisitions 5
TOTAL 156 TOTAL 66

2004-2005 Projection

CATHOLIC COMMUNITY PROTESTANT COMMUNITY
Scheme Units Scheme Units
Henderson Avenue 12 Gainsborough Phase 1 26
Woodland Avenue 13 Mountcollyer 35
Henry Place 9 Ballysillan Road 8
Brookhill Avenue 9 Summerhill Court 9
BT Site 2 Torrens 34
Baltic Avenue 9
Newington Acquisitions 12
Flax Acquisitions 9
Clanmil Acquisitions 7
TOTAL 54 TOTAL 112

Piczo